How to Delete a Secret by Hao F & Clarke D
  
COMPUTING 
SCIENCE 
How to Delete a Secret 
 
 
Feng Hao and Dylan Clarke 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TECHNICAL REPORT SERIES 
 
No. CS-TR-1364 December 2012 
TECHNICAL REPORT SERIES 
              
 
No. CS-TR-1364  December, 2012 
 
How to Delete a Secret 
 
F. Hao and D. Clarke 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper discusses the secure data erasure problem and introduces a new Proof of 
Deletion protocol, which assures secure data deletion in a way that any independent 
third party can verify cryptographically. The use of cryptography in data deletion is 
not new, but previous solutions are unsatisfactory as they merely return a single bit: 
whether the deletion is successful. However, this single bit is not easily verifiable. 
The implementation of the underlying deletion mechanism is entirely opaque to a 
user. This is particularly the case when the encryption program is encapsulated within 
a tamper resistant chip. Furthermore, all existing solutions claim only to make "best 
efforts" to delete data, but without any commitment to the outcome. Our protocol 
systematically addresses all these issues. First, we provide an auditing function to 
facilitate a user verifying that the encryption was done correctly. Second, instead of 
returning just one bit like all previous data deletion schemes, our solution returns a 
proof of deletion that is universally verifiable. This returned proof formalizes the 
commitment of the storage system in erasing data and cryptographically binds this 
commitment to the outcome of the operation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2012 Newcastle University. 
Printed and published by Newcastle University, 
Computing Science, Claremont Tower, Claremont Road, 
Newcastle upon Tyne, NE1 7RU, England. 
Bibliographical details 
 
HAO, F., CLARKE, D. 
 
How to Delete a Secret  
[By] F. Hao, D. Clarke 
 
Newcastle upon Tyne: Newcastle University: Computing Science, 2012. 
 
(Newcastle University, Computing Science, Technical Report Series, No. CS-TR-1364) 
 
Added entries 
 
NEWCASTLE UNIVERSITY 
Computing Science. Technical Report Series.  CS-TR-1364 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper discusses the secure data erasure problem and introduces a new Proof of Deletion protocol, which 
assures secure data deletion in a way that any independent third party can verify cryptographically. The use of 
cryptography in data deletion is not new, but previous solutions are unsatisfactory as they merely return a single 
bit: whether the deletion is successful. However, this single bit is not easily verifiable. The implementation of the 
underlying deletion mechanism is entirely opaque to a user. This is particularly the case when the encryption 
program is encapsulated within a tamper resistant chip. Furthermore, all existing solutions claim only to make 
"best efforts" to delete data, but without any commitment to the outcome. Our protocol systematically addresses 
all these issues. First, we provide an auditing function to facilitate a user verifying that the encryption was done 
correctly. Second, instead of returning just one bit like all previous data deletion schemes, our solution returns a 
proof of deletion that is universally verifiable. This returned proof formalizes the commitment of the storage 
system in erasing data and cryptographically binds this commitment to the outcome of the operation. 
 
About the authors 
 
Feng Hao is a Lecturer of CSR. He received his BEng (2001) and MEng (2003) in electrical and electronic 
engineering from Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, and a PhD (2007) in computer science from the 
University of Cambridge, England. His research interests include biometrics, cryptography, fuzzy search 
algorithms, information coding, and error correction codes. 
 
Dylan Clarke is a Research Associate in the School of Computing Science. He received his MMath in 2002, his 
MSc in SDIA in 2008 and his PhD in 2012, all from Newcastle University. Between 2003 and 2007 he worked for 
Redcar and Cleveland Borough Council developing CRM systems, and received an Innovation Award and a letter 
of commendation for this work. Dylan's PhD centred around the topic of enhancing intrusion resilience in publicly 
accessible distributed systems and was supervised by Dr. Paul Ezhilchelvan. His current research interests are e-
voting, authenticated key exchange and other security topics. 
 
Suggested keywords 
 
SECURITY 
DELETION 
CRYPTOGRAPHY 
TRUST 
How to Delete a Secret
Feng Hao, Dylan Clarke
School of Computing Science
Newcastle University
{feng.hao, dylan.clarke}@ncl.ac.uk
Abstract. This paper discusses the secure data erasure problem and
introduces a new Proof of Deletion protocol, which assures secure data
deletion in a way that any independent third party can verify crypto-
graphically. The use of cryptography in data deletion is not new, but
previous solutions are unsatisfactory as they merely return a single bit:
whether the deletion is successful. However, this single bit is not easily
verifiable. The implementation of the underlying deletion mechanism is
entirely opaque to a user. This is particularly the case when the encryp-
tion program is encapsulated within a tamper resistant chip. Further-
more, all existing solutions claim only to make “best efforts” to delete
data, but without any commitment to the outcome. Our protocol sys-
tematically addresses all these issues. First, we provide an auditing func-
tion to facilitate a user verifying that the encryption was done correctly.
Second, instead of returning just one bit like all previous data deletion
schemes, our solution returns a proof of deletion that is universally ver-
ifiable. This returned proof formalizes the commitment of the storage
system in erasing data and cryptographically binds this commitment to
the outcome of the operation.
1 Introduction
You normally change the problem if you can’t solve it.
– David Wheeler
Alice saves her data on a disk storage system that uses magnetic drives. She
routinely deletes some data, which may be confidential. When she deletes a
secret, she wishes the deletion to be permanent. The disclosure of the secret may
harm her privacy. The question is: how to ensure to delete a secret securely?
One simple solution is to physically destroy the disk. However, that would
imply that every time when Alice wishes to delete some secret data, she would
have to purchase a new disk. The cost will be prohibitively high.
There are two alternative solutions: through overwriting or encryption [5].
The first method works by using software means to overwrite disk locations where
the data is stored. However, as explained in [4,10,12,14,16,18], an attacker with
an advanced microscope and suitable tools may still be able to recover deleted
data even after the disk has been overwritten many times. The second method
works by encrypting data using a key, and then deleting the data by disposing of
the key [5,15,16]. In this paper, we will focus on discussing the second method.
The encryption-based approach simplifies the problem of deleting a large
amount of data to deleting a short secret key (say 16 bytes), however the funda-
mental question remains to be answered: how to securely delete the key. Three
solutions were proposed in the past literature. The first is by physical destruc-
tion. As suggested by Boneh and Lipton [5], the user is asked to write down the
key on paper or a floppy disk, and later delete the key by physically destroying
the medium. However, this method can prove inconvenient and error-prone in
practice. The second method is through overwriting. As described in [12, 16],
the key is stored on the disk alongside the ciphertext, and the deletion is done
by overwriting the location where the key is stored. However, as we explained
earlier, this returns to the previous argument that a clean deletion on the disk
is not possible [9]. The third approach is to use a tamper resistant module (e.g.
a smartcard) to store the key [15]. The module deletes the key by removing the
reference to the key from the program and overwrites the memory location where
the key was stored with zeros or random data.
All the above sofware-based deletion methods – through overwriting [4, 10,
12, 14, 16, 18] or encryption [5, 12, 15, 16] – return just a single bit indicating
whether the deletion is successful. This however has two limitations. First, the
single bit is not easily verifiable. The user has to trust that the deletion software
had been implemented correctly in the first place. Second, the single bit does not
clearly indicate liability in the case of a failure. For example, a user may claim
that the program returned a “YES” bit, though the secret had not been been
deleted. Meanwhile, we cannot exclude the possibility that the user might have
misread the bit or might have dishonestly flipped its value (in order to discredit
the program). This ambiguous liability can lead to misplaced incentives. Instead
of focusing on ensuring a correct implementation of secure data erasure, the
solution provider may try to deny the existence of problem and claim that the
complaints come from dishonest users.
In this paper, we will propose a solution that addresses all of the above
problems. Our solution is also based on cryptography, but it differs from the
previous cryptography-based methods (see [5,15,16]) in two ways. First, instead
of returning just a single bit, it returns a proof that any independent third party
can verify. The proof is, as we will explain later, a digitally signed Service Level
Agreement. Second, we improve the transparency of the encryption process by
adding an auditing mechanism through which the user can verify whether the
encryption was done correctly. In contrast, in previous works [5, 15,16], there is
no means for verifying the correctness of the encryption software. The fact that
the decryption of an encrypted message returns the same plaintext message is
insufficient to assure the encryption program had been implemented correctly.
In the following section, we will explain our solution in detail.
2 Our solution
Before describing the technical solution, there is a business obstacle we need to
overcome. In the usual business model, data storage is a paid service (Alice pays
to buy a disk for storing data), but the deletion is free (she can freely delete data
to get more storage space). A free service naturally comes with no assurance.
This model provides strong incentives for the storage providers to improve the
reliability of the disk, but not much to assure secure data erasure.
To make the solution more meaningful, we slightly change the problem by
assuming Alice is willing to pay for secure data erasure. We do not find this
assumption explicitly made in previous papers [4,5,8–16,18], but we believe this
is a reasonable assumption. Given that Alice pays for secure data erasure, it is
natural for Alice to expect higher assurance than just a “best-effort operation”.
The mere single bit return is clearly unsatisfactory.
2.1 System overview
We give an overview of a secure Data Storage and Erasure (DSE) system in
Figures 1. The system consists of two basic components: a mass storage device
and a tamper resistant module. For simplicity, we call the former a “disk” and
the latter a “chip”. The user is able to freely access any location on the disk.
The chip has an embedded processor and a secure memory. All crypto keys are
kept inside its memory. A host program cannot directly access the keys but it
can make use of the keys through specified Application Programming Interfaces
(APIs). Normally, the host program must be authenticated to the chip before
being able to invoke APIs (e.g., through passwords, user biometrics or some
challenge-response protocol).
Fig. 1. Overview of a secure Data Storage and Erasure (DSE) system
2.2 Protocol
We now describe a Proof of Deletion (PoD) protocol in the setting of an addi-
tive cycle group defined over an elliptic curve. (Alternatively, we can also use
Notations Meaning
Prvchip, Pubchip Unique ECDSA key pair for each chip
C Client user
Ci Instance of the client
PrvCi Private key of the client instance, PrvCi := dCi
PubCi Public key of the client instance, PubCi := dCi ·G
m Input message
Qη Ephemeral public key during DHIES Qη = dη ·G
EAuthkη (m) Authenticated encryption of m using a symmetric key kη
E(PubCi ,m) Encryption of m under PubCi using DHIES, E(PubCi ,m) := {Qη, EAuthkη (m)}
η Reference to the ciphertext E(PubCi ,m)
ZKPη Zero Knowledge Proof to prove the well-formedness of ciphertext η
SLAdelCi Service Level Agreement for the deletion of client instance Ci
sig(...) Signed message using the chip’s ECDSA private key Prvchip
Table 1. Notations and meaning
a multiplicative cycle group of prime order; this does not make any difference
to the basic protocol.) Let E be an underlying elliptic curve for the Elliptic
Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) [17] and G be a base point on the
curve with the prime order n. Each chip contains a unique ECDSA signature
key pair: Prvchip and Pubchip (which are normally generated on-board during
the personalization stage at the factory so the private key never leaves the chip).
The chip manufacturer shall publish the ECDSA public key for every chip on a
public website. We define the following APIs for the chip (refer to Table 1 for a
summary of notations).
– KeyGen(1k, C) creates an instance of the client user C. It takes as input a
security parameter 1k and the identity of the user C, generates a private key
on-board PrvCi := dCi ∈R [1, n−1], and returns the corresponding public key
PubCi := dCi ·G and an index reference Ci to the created key pair. The user
C is free to create as many instances as she wishes, subject to the constraint
of memory size. As an example, with 160-bit n, 32-bit index Ci and a chip
of 16 MB EEPROM memory (see [1]), up to 666,667 user instances can be
created. This function can be formalized as (for simplicity, we will omit error
returns in all functions):
Host → Chip : 1k, C (KeyGen)
Chip : Generate PrvCi := dCi
Chip→ Host : PubCi := dCi ·G, Ci
– Encrypt(Ci,m) takes as input the reference to the created user instance
Ci, a message m and returns the encrypted message under the public key
PubCi . For the encryption, we adopt the Diffie-Hellman Integrated Encryp-
tion Scheme (DHIES) [3], which works as follows. First, the chip generates
an ephemeral public key Qη = dη ·G where dη ∈R [1, n−1] . It then computes
kη = H(dCi · Qη) where H is a cryptographic hash function. Subsequently,
the symmetric key kη is used to encrypt the message in an authenticated
manner to obtain EAuthkη (m). (The authenticated encryption involves split-
ting kη into two halves, macKeyη and encKeyη, with the first half used to
encrypt the message and the second half to compute an authentication tag.)
Details about DHIES can be found in [3]. The returned ciphertext will be
stored in the mass storage device with a reference η (which may be a location
address on the disk). This function can be formalized as:
Host → Chip : Ci, m (Encrypt)
Chip→ User : Qη := dη ·G, EAuthkη (m)
– Decrypt(Ci, η) takes as input the reference of an existential user instance
Ci and a ciphertext referenced by η and returns a decrypted message. The
function follows the decryption procedure as detailed in DHIES [3]. If the
ciphertext has not been tampered with, the original message m will be re-
turned. This function can be formalized as:
Host → Chip : Ci, Qη, Ekη (m) (Decrypt)
Chip→ Host : m
– Audit(Ci, η) takes the same input as in Decrypt and allows the user to verify
whether the encryption was done correctly. The ciphertext consists of two
components, Qη and EAuthkη (m), which are related by the formula: kη =
H(dCi · Qη). To allow the auditing of the first component, the chip checks
that Qη is a valid public key on the curve, and then outputs dCi ·Qη and a
Zero Knowledge Proof (ZKP), which proves that logGdCi ·G = logQηdCi ·Qη
without leaking anything about the private key dCi . The ZKP is based on the
Chaum-Pederson protocol [6], which is made non-interactive by applying the
Fiat-Shamir transformation [7]. Subsequently, the host is able to compute
the symmetric key kη = H(dCi ·Qη) and verify the ciphertext according to the
specified symmetric cipher (say AES). Note that this auditing only reveals
the session key for the encryption of a specified message; other messages
encrypted under the same user instance’s public key are not affected. This
function is formalized as:
Host → Chip : Ci, Qη, EAuthkη (m) (Audit)
Chip→ Host : dCi ·Qη, ZKPη[logGdCi ·G = logQηdCi ·Qη]
– Delete(Ci) deletes a user instance Ci by overwriting its private key dCi in
the chip’s memory and returns SLAdelCi , which is a Service Level Agreement
{“Delete”, PubCi} signed by the chip’s ECDSA signing key. After the erasure
of the private key, all messages encrypted under PubCi can no longer be
decrypted. If the user discovers that the system failed to erase the private
key as instructed, she can prove this in court by presenting dCi together with
SLAdelCi . Accordingly, she should be entitled to compensation on the grounds
of the violation of the Service Level Agreement. This function is formalized
as:
Host → Chip : Ci (Delete)
Chip→ Host : SLAdelCi := Sig(“Delete”,PubCi)
3 Analysis and discussion
Data thief A data thief is an adversary who wishes to recover the deleted secret.
We assume the attacker has physical access to both the disk and the chip. He is
able to read all data from the disk including those that had been overwritten or
deleted in the past. In addition, he is able to bypass the authentication mecha-
nism (e.g., he knows the password), and invoke the APIs of the chip. Under this
threat model, our goal is to prevent him from recovering deleted secrets.
All data stored on the disk is encrypted under the DHIES algorithm. The
correctness of the cipher implementation can be verified by the user through the
Audit function. Based on the security proofs of the DHIES paper [3], without
the private key, the ciphertext is indistinguishable from random data. Hence,
the attacker must obtain the key.
To recover a deleted key, the attacker needs to penetrate two lines of de-
fence. First, he needs to break the tamper resistance of the chip in order to
access the memory. Second, he needs to recover the overwritten key from the
memory. Breaking the tamper resistance is not impossible, but can prove costly.
Furthermore, if the program on the chip did overwrite the key in the memory
with random data even for one or two passes, recovering the key can prove very
expensive [8, 9]. In summary, if the chip vendor has implemented the protocol
correctly, the cost of recovering a deleted secret can be quite high for the attacker
(probably higher than the value of the secret itself).
Incompetent Vendor The above analysis is based on the assumption that
the chip vendor is competent to get the software correct, but that may not be
case. Software bugs and implementation blunders can leave the chip in a vulnera-
ble state, allowing an attacker to easily bypass the physical tamper resistance [2].
In that case, the cost of breaking the tamper resistance can be significantly low-
ered. In addition, if the software does not overwrite the key in memory (despite
that this is a trivial step in the code), an attacker may further be able to extract
the deleted key by scanning the memory. In the real world, if serious vulnera-
bilities of a “tamper resistant” chip are discovered, the stock price of the chip
vendor will drop, and customers will choose a different supplier. Based on the
arguments of security economics [2], a security system should be designed such
that the entity in the best position to protect security must be liable for the
failure. Our solution just does that.
Here, we do not consider the threat of a dishonest vendor. We assume the
chip vendor is a commercial entity, delivering a solution to a mass market. It
is in their commercial interest not to put malicious software on the chip. We
understand this assumption may be challenged in some cases. But if a user deals
with high-grade secrets, she probably should not use an off-the-shelf product.
Instead, she should carefully choose a provider that she trusts (or in the extreme
case implement her own solution).
Dishonest user A dishonest user is one who wishes to profit from claiming
for compensation. To claim for compensation, the user will need to present a
signed SLA together with the private key dCi that is supposed to have been
deleted. There are two ways of attack: 1) by overcoming the tamper resistance
and then extracting the ECDSA signing key from the chip memory; or 2) by
overcoming tamper resistance and then recovering the overwritten key in the
memory. If a chip is sufficiently costly to reverse engineer, a dishonest user will
not able to profit from this attack. On the other hand, if the chip is vulnerable,
one will be able to prove that in a publicly verifiable way. The proof will indicate
that either the chip has failed to protect the ECDSA private key with tamper
resistance or it has failed to securely erase the key from the persistent memory.
Between the two attacks, the first one can be easier than the second. As long
as the dishonest user is able to extract the ECDSA private key from the secure
memory, he does not need to go further to recover the overwritten key in the
memory. He can use the extracted private key to generate an SLA, and demand
compensation. This is a short-cut in the attack, which needs to be considered
when devising the pricing strategy as we discuss below.
Pricing strategy If the user shows evidence to prove that the chip vendor
has failed on the Service Level Agreement, she may be entitled to compensation.
Depending on the details of SLA, the compensation may be a fixed amount or
an amount that is proportional to what the user pays for buying the solution.
We begin by taking C1 to be the cost of penetrating the secure memory in
the chip (i.e., so as to extract the ECDSA signing key) and C2 to be the cost of
recovering an overwritten key from the secure memory. Hence, the overall cost to
recover a deleted key from the chip is: C = C1+C2. We denote P be the selling
price of that chip, and N be the amount of compensation. As long as N ≤ P+C1,
then no dishonest user will be able to make a profit by reverse engineering a chip.
Let us denote T as the cost of producing the chip. When P−T > N , a chip vendor
will be able to unfairly profit by simply producing low-cost but insecure chips
and attempt to sell a large amount of them before this insecurity is discovered.
Then, when the insecurity is discovered, the provider can pay compensation to
every user, making a profit of P − T − N for each chip. Hence, a reasonable
amount for compensation should be defined within the following range:
P − T ≤ N ≤ P + C1
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented a Proof of Deletion (PoD) protocol, which
ensures secure data erasure based on cryptography. As compared with related
schemes in the past, our protocol improves transparency in the encryption by
allowing a user to easily audit the encryption process. In addition, while previous
solutions all chose to make a “best efforts” attempt at deleting data, our scheme
does this but also provides a proof of commitment. In the case of failure, the
proof will serve as universally verifiable evidence to indicate failure, based on
which the user should be entitled for compensation.
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